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...the glorification of settling for  the best  inequality  has  to offer  or  has stimulated the resourceful  to
invent, are what Ti-Grace Atkinson meant to reject when she said, "I do not know any feminist worthy  of
that name who, if forced to choose between freedom and sex, would choose sex. She'd choose freedom
every time."1
In her essay “Why I'm Against S/M Liberation” (in Against Sadomasochism), Ti Grace Atkinson says, “I do
not know any feminist worthy of that name who, if forced to choose between freedom and sex, would
choose sex.” While women are forced to make such a choice we cannot consider ourselves free.2
1 – The prospect of a liberal anti-porn feminism
Catharine MacKinnon has presented two defences of several anti-pornography civil rights
ordinances,  which  classify  the  trafficking  (i.e.  the  production,  sale,  exhibition  or
distribution) of pornography as a form of discrimination on the basis of sex.3 First, she
justifies the ordinances by drawing attention to the role pornography purportedly plays in
the  subordination  of  women  to  men.  Pornography  sexualizes  gender  inequality  and
thereby helps to sustain gender inequality by making it attractive and constitutive of sex.
Pornography should not be trafficked if  we want an end to gender inequality. Second,
MacKinnon presents what was originally a pre-emptive defence of the ordinances against
the predictable challenge that, in restricting the trafficking of pornography, the ordinances
violate the free speech rights of pornographers.  According to the pre-emptive defence,
pornography  silences  women's  speech  and  so  restrictions  on  the  trafficking  of
pornography are needed in order to protect women's freedom of speech: the liberty of
pornographers already infringes the liberty of women and the ordinances are required to
address this. This is the free speech argument against pornography (the FS argument).4
1 Catharine MacKinnon, “Sexuality, Pornography, and Method: ‘Pleasure under Patriarchy,’” Ethics 99, no.
2 (1989): 344.
2 Ann Snitow, “Retrenchment vs. Transformation: The Politics of the Antipornography Movement,” Caught
Looking: Feminism, Pornography & Censorship, 1992, 17.
3 For  a  model  of  such  an  ordinance  see  Andrea  Dworkin,  “Against  the  Male  Flood:  Censorship,
Pornography,  and  Equality,”  Harvard  Women’s  Law  Journal 8  (1985):  1–30. For  the  Minneapolis,
Indianapolis,  and Massachusetts ordinances see  Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon,  eds.,  In
Harm’s Way:  The Pornography Civil  Rights  Hearings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,  1997).
When I speak of “anti-porn” feminists, I am not speaking of people who merely believe that pornography
plays a role in gender inequality. I am speaking of people who wish to legally restrict it. I thus diverge
from Anne Eaton's talk of “anti-porn” feminism in  “A Sensible Anti-Porn Feminism,”  Ethics 117, no. 4
(2007): 674–715.
4 Succinct  and  straightforward  statements of  the  FS  argument  can  be  found  in  “Memo  on  Proposed
Ordinance” in  Dworkin and MacKinnon,  In Harm’s Way: The Pornography Civil Rights Hearings, 258–59
and in  Andrea Dworkin, “Dworkin on Dworkin,” in  Radically Speaking: Feminism Reclaimed,  eds. Diane
Bell  and Renate  Klein  (Melbourne:  Spinifex  Press,  1996),  203–17. The  argument  is  also  stated in  the
Indianapolis, Minneapolis, and Massachusetts hearings, cf. Dworkin and MacKinnon, In Harm’s Way: The
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Philosophers  Jennifer  Hornsby,  Rae  Langton  and  Caroline  West  have  taken  the  FS
argument to be consistent with and implied by a liberal's  commitments:  the argument
doesn't show that the liberal is wrong to be a liberal. The argument shows instead what,
unbeknownst to the liberal, the liberal is really committed to.5 Although the soundness of
the FS argument is contested, this positioning of the FS argument as liberal-friendly is
influential within feminist philosophy of language and it is beginning to gain acceptance
outside of philosophy.6
But this  positioning of  the FS argument jars  with MacKinnon's  own antipathy toward
liberalism.7 For  example,  when  she  comments  on  the  philosophical  literature  that  has
developed as a defence of and expansion upon her legal work on pornography—literature
that Hornsby and Langton pioneered, and that for which West provides the authoritative
survey—MacKinnon writes:
Why all these topics must be considered within the confines of liberalism is not  
broached even sideways, leaving liberalism assumed rather than interrogated. It is 
as if liberalism alone makes this discussion possible rather than also creates some of
these issues and limits the means of effectively grappling with them.8
It  would be surprising if  it  turned out—as Hornsby,  Langton and West suppose—that
MacKinnon's  FS argument really is  a  demonstration of  what the liberal  is  unwittingly
committed to, rather than a demonstration of why the liberal as such is wrong. 
In this paper, I am going to argue for an exclusive disjunction: either the FS argument
makes  the  legislation  it  defends,  to  some  degree,  self-defeating,  or,  it  is  not  a
demonstration of what a liberal is unwittingly committed to. One cannot decouple the
argument  from  MacKinnon's  anti-liberalism  without  rendering  the  argument  self-
Pornography  Civil  Rights  Hearings,  41–42,  274,  391.  The  statements  of  the  argument  most  commonly
referenced by philosophers are in  MacKinnon's “Francis  Biddle's  Sister” and “Not a Moral  Issue” in
Catharine  MacKinnon,  Feminism  Unmodified:  Discourses  on  Life  and  Law (Cambridge,  MA:  Harvard
University Press, 1987).
5 Rae Langton, “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts,”  Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (1993): 329–30., Rae
Langton,  “Introduction,”  in  Sexual  Solipsism:  Philosophical  Essays  on  Pornography  and  Objectification
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 9., Jennifer Hornsby, “Speech Acts and Pornography,” Women’s
Philosophy  Review 10  (1993):  43.,  Caroline  West,  “The  Free  Speech  Argument  Against  Pornography,”
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33, no. 3 (2003): 393–94.
6 Nick Cowen, “Millian Liberalism and Extreme Pornography,” American Journal of Political Science 60, no. 2
(2016): 509–20.
7 MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law, 15–16, p.99, p.129, pp.136-137, p.146, p.155,
p.164, p.205; Catharine MacKinnon, “Liberalism and the Death of Feminism,” in  The Sexual Liberals and
the Attack on Feminism,  ed. Dorchen Leidholdt and Janice Raymond (New York: Teachers College Press,
1990),  3–13;  Catharine MacKinnon,  “The ‘Case’ Responds,”  American Political  Science  Review 95,  no.  3
(2001): 709–11.
8 Catharine MacKinnon, “Forward,” in  Speech and Harm: Controversies Over Free Speech,  ed. Ishani Maitra
and Kate McGowan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), xvii.
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defeating. I proceed as follows. In section 2, I introduce the ordinances that MacKinnon
defended with the FS argument. In section 3, I describe a significant and growing class of
women from whose hands and mouths pornographic speech derives. The liberty of such
women to produce this speech (and of other women to consume it) will be abridged by
restrictions on the trafficking of pornography. Even if the ordinances promote women's
safety by protecting them against the harms of pornography, even if the ordinances protect
women's  liberty  against  infringement  by  pornographers,  and  even  if  the  ordinances
promote gender equality by (amongst other things) stopping men from disempowering
women, the ordinances seem simultaneously to limit women's  freedom. In section 4,  I
show that, despite the existence of these women, the philosophers and MacKinnon write
in ways that imply the non-existence of women who are pornographers. But as I explain in
section 5, MacKinnon adopts a view about women's autonomy that both permits her to
deny  that  there  are  women  who  are  pornographers  (even  while  acknowledging  the
existence of the women described in section 3), and it permits her a reading of the FS
argument on which it does not at all make the ordinances self-defeating. But as I explain in
section  6,  Hornsby,  Langton  and  West  cannot  adopt  MacKinnon's  view  of  women's
autonomy to buttress this alternative reading of the FS argument unless they abandon an
important liberal commitment. Thus the FS argument only seems simultaneously cogent
and  liberal-friendly  when  one  glosses  over  women's  differences  by  disattending  the
women described in section 3.
2 – The Ordinances
The ordinances share two features: a definition of “pornography” and a specification of
causes of action i.e. the conditions under which someone can use the ordinances to sue
someone. We're going to focus on the trafficking cause of action. Who can sue under this
cause of action? In the Minneapolis, Indianapolis and Massachusetts ordinances, we are
told:  'Any  woman  has  a  cause  of  action  hereunder  as  a  woman  acting  against  the
subordination of women.'9 The ordinances thus empower any woman to sue any trafficker
of  pornography simply for  being that.  In  what  follows,  I  will  present  the  ordinances'
definition of pornography, and provide a circumscribed interpretation of that definition
that will allow us to identify what, if anything, would qualify as pornography as defined
by the ordinances. I intend the conclusion of this paper to apply to any restrictions on the
trafficking of pornography as defined in this section.
“Pornography” is defined in the ordinances in three parts. 
Part I
Pornography is the sexually explicit  subordination of women through words or  
pictures.
MacKinnon  makes  clear  elsewhere  that  pornography,  so  defined,  is  a  set  of  sexually
9 Dworkin and MacKinnon, In Harm’s Way: The Pornography Civil Rights Hearings, 436, 449, 460.
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explicit materials, viz., those words or pictures that subordinate women.10 The second part
of  the  definition  makes  pornography  a  subset of  sexually  explicit  materials  that
subordinate women, viz., those that also include certain contents.
Part II
The words or pictures through which women are subordinated must also include 
one of the following contents:
(i) women are presented dehumanized as sexual objects, things or commodities;
or
(ii) women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or 
(iii) women are  presented  as  sexual  objects  who  experience  sexual  pleasure  in
being raped; or 
(iv) women are  presented  as  sexual  objects  tied  up  or  cut  up  or  mutilated  or
bruised or physically hurt; or 
(v) women are presented in postures of sexual submission; or 
(vi) women's  body  parts—including  but  not  limited  to  vaginas,  breasts,  and
buttocks—are exhibited, such that women are reduced to those parts; or 
(vii) women are presented as whores by nature; or 
(viii) women are presented being penetrated by objects or animals; or 
(ix) women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, abasement, torture,
shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes
these conditions sexual.11 
The third part of the definition broadens the range of contents listed in part II:
Part III
The use of men, children or transsexuals in the place of women in [part II, (i)-(ix)] is 
pornography.12
10 MacKinnon  Feminism  Unmodified:  Discourses  on  Life  and  Law,  176.  Langton  (in  “Speech  Acts  and
Unspeakable Acts”) distinguishes between a causal and a constitutive version of the claim that something
subordinates women. This distinction makes no difference to any line of reasoning in what follows, so I
don't draw it.
11 Items (i), (v), (vi), and (vii) do not appear in the Indianapolis ordinance. However, the following is added:
'Women are presented as sexual objects for domination, conquest, violation, exploitation, possession, or
use, or through postures or positions of servility or submission or display.' Items (vi) and (vii) do not
appear in the Massachusetts ordinance.
12 In the model  ordinance described by  Dworkin,  (“Dworkin on Dworkin.”),  and in the Massachusetts
ordinance,  it's  unclear  whether  part  III  is  supposed to apply to part  I  as  well  as  part  II.  But  in  the
Minneapolis and Indianapolis ordinances, part III explicitly applies only to part II. The difference matters.
If part III applies to part I, then the ordinance combats the subordination of women, men, children and
transsexuals. If part III applies only to part II, then the ordinance combats the subordination of women
only. Because Hornsby, Langton and West focus upon the Minneapolis and Indianapolis ordinances, I will
assume that part III does not apply to part I.
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So any material that subordinates women which contains one of the relevant contents will
qualify as pornography.
There remains the question (of definition): what is required of material in order for it to
subordinate women? The ordinances are premised upon a theory of the role played by
pornography in sustaining gender inequality.13 According to that theory, sexually explicit
material  that  depicts  force  used by  men against  women,  or,  which depicts  women as
submitting to men without force, makes us think of and see such relations between the
sexes as what it is to be those sexes and what it is to engage in normal (non-prosecutable)
sex. This has ramifications for both what men and women consider to be acceptable and
what  men  can  legally  get  away  with  doing  to  women.  For  example,  it  reduces  the
proportion of sex events which one might classify as sexual assault: sex wherein a man
coerces a woman, or sex between a man and an unwilling but submissive woman, come to
be seen as normal parts of gender relations, and hence, not sexual assault. Consequently,
men have de facto rights to enforce their own will over women in a variety of contexts and
women  de facto lack the apparatus to seek justice against this enforcement through the
legal system.
The debate about what sexually explicit material does lacks consensus.14 But it should be
relatively uncontroversial that, if any material plays the role described by this theory then
sexually explicit material that has one of the following contents does so:
 force being exerted over women by men (or persons playing these social roles) in a
way that is sexually arousing.
 women conforming to men's wishes even without the exertion of force (or where
persons play the social roles of men and women) in a way that is sexually arousing.
I will call such material: material which eroticizes dominance/submission. I assume that
whatever is required for material to qualify as subordinating, if anything satisfies those
requirements,  material  which  eroticizes  dominance/submission  satisfies  those
requirements. I assume this because material which eroticizes dominance/submission is
the least controversial candidate for material that might play the role described by the
theory upon which the ordinances are premised, and because it is  surely material that
plays this role which the ordinances are defined to target. Merely sexually explicit material
will not qualify as pornography. Merely sexually explicit material  which includes one of
13 Descriptions of this theory can be found throughout MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life
and Law, 3–5, 148-150, 160, 171-174, 181, 187-190. See Edward Donnerstein's testimony in the Minneapolis
hearing  and  MacKinnon's  interview  with  Donnerstein  for  a  detailed  description  of  some  empirical
research on the effects of watching sexually explicit  material of different kinds, which seems to have
informed the theory upon which the ordinances are premised,  cf.  Dworkin and MacKinnon,  In Harm’s
Way: The Pornography Civil Rights Hearings, 44–60, 290-310.
14 In Eaton's survey of the empirical literature, she concludes, 'we understand the claim that pornography
causes harm as a hypothesis that has yet to be conclusively proved (or refuted).' Eaton, “A Sensible Anti-
Porn Feminism,” 715.
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(i)-(ix), but  without any exercise of power by a man over a woman (or persons playing
these social roles),  will  not qualify as pornography by our definition. Sexually explicit
material  needs  to  depict  such  a  gendered  exertion  of  power  in  order  to  qualify  as
pornography in our narrowed sense.
Although perhaps narrower than MacKinnon intended, this interpretation of part I of the
definition of pornography both allows us to readily identify material most likely to be
targetted by the ordinances (despite the absence of consensus on the effects of sexually
explicit material) and avoids rattling the liberal simply by encompassing too broad a range
of material.
3 The ordinances enhance and abridge women's liberty
Testifying against the Los Angeles legislation, Sandra Hale said:
Pornography and the degradation of and violence against women must be stopped, 
but as I was quoted in the LA Times as saying “The strategies we use must not  
abridge our freedoms.”15
Hale believed that the ordinance was a method for addressing a genuine problem but it
was  a  method that  simultaneously  abridged women's  liberty  and  for  this  reason,  she
opposed it.16 But if the ordinances are aimed at protecting women's liberty, what could
Hale be worrying about?
I will  provide evidence that women traffic pornography. Their liberty to do this, and the
liberty of women to view that material, would be abridged by the ordinances. I conclude
from this that there is a degree to which the ordinances are self-defeating: when defended
by  the  FS  argument,  they  are  a  method  for  protecting  women's  liberty  which
simultaneously abridges it. I will make an effort to explain some of the reasons women
had and have for trafficking (and consuming) this kind of material. This will prepare the
way for a response at the end of this section to an objection against the charge of self-
defeat.
3.1 On Our Backs
The beginning of the 1970s saw a demand from lesbians to be more central within the U.S.
feminist movement.17 In stating this demand, the idea was floated of a lesbianism that was
15 Dworkin and MacKinnon, In Harm’s Way: The Pornography Civil Rights Hearings, 344. Hale lost her job as
Director of Women's Studies at her university for re-hiring Betty Brooks, who had been fired for her
alleged use of pornographic material and her advocacy of lesbianism in her course Health, Bodies, and
Sexuality.
16 For the same objection against the ordinances, see also the Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce (FACT)
Nan Hunter and Sylvia Law, “The FACT Brief,” in  Sex Wars: Sexual Dissent and Political Culture (New
York: New York, 2006), 265.
17 Carolyn  Bronstein,  Battling  Pornography:  The  American  Feminist  Anti-Pornography  Movement,  1976-1986
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 52–62.
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not  primarily  a  sexual  orientation  but  instead  a  political  choice  and  a  significant
component  of  this  political  choice  was  abstinence  from  so-called  male  identified
behaviour.18 Lesbian feminism, thus understood, gained traction within the U.S. feminist
movement. By the end of the 1970s, it had created something of an orthodoxy about the
kind of sex that women ought and ought not to have. As Nan Kinney describes it:
...penetration by any means was perceived as a violent, male-identified, dominant 
act,  and  was  therefore  not  to  be  done.  Lesbians  were  having  very  limited,  
politically-correct, side-by-side sex.19
One  gets  a  sense  of  the  range  of  behaviour  that  this  orthodoxy  governed from  the
published version of Amber Hollibaugh's contribution to the 1982 Barnard Conference on
sexuality (a conference organized in opposition to the growing feminist anti-pornography
movement of the time):
Who are all the women who don't come gently and don't want to; don't know yet 
what they like but intend to find out; are the lovers of butch or femme women; who 
like fucking with men; practice consensual s/m; feel more like faggots than dykes; 
love dildoes, penetration, costumes; like to sweat, talk dirty, see expressions of need
sweep across their lovers' faces; are confused and need to experiment with their  
own tentative ideas of passion; think gay male porn is hot; are into power? Are we 
creating a political movement that we can no longer belong to if we don't feel our 
desires fit a model of proper feminist sex?20
In response to this  new orthodoxy,  Kinney and Debi Sundahl began, in the Summer of
1984,  to publish a sexually explicit  magazine made by and for lesbians:  On Our Backs
(OOB).21 OOB included sexually explicit  pictures,  stories and articles.  The pictures and
stories depicted women being penetrated by objects, women on display, and fantasies that
included the use of coercion, humiliation, and violence. They also depicted fantasies that
included none of these things. The contents were designed to appeal to an audience of
diverse sexual tastes and curiosities. The articles encompassed features on sexual practices
such  as  orgasm  from  g-spot  stimulation,22 female  ejaculation  resulting  from  use  of  a
dildo,23 group  sex,24 and  phone  sex.25 There  were  also  features  on  sexual  health.  For
18 Radicalesbians, The Woman Identified Woman (Pittsburgh: Know Inc., 1970), 3.
19 Nan Kinney, Nan Kinney - Uncovering a Pornographic Lesbian Sensibility: An Interview with Lesbian
Pornographer  Nan  Kinney,  interview  by  Cory  Silverberg,  2007,
http://sexuality.about.com/od/eroticentertainment/a/nan_kinney.htm.
20 Amber Hollibaugh, “Desire for the Future: Radical Hope in Passion and Pleasure,” in Pleasure and Danger:
Exploring Female Sexuality, ed. Carole Vance (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), 403.
21 Debi Sundahl, Melissa Murphy, and Erin Findlay, On Our Backs, 1984-2005.
22 OOB (Fall 1984, vol. 1, issue 2, p.7; Summer 1985, vol. 2, issue 1, pp.37-38).
23 OOB (Fall 1985, vol. 2. issue 2, p.37).
24 OOB (Spring 1986, vol. 2, issue 4, p.6).
25 OOB (Jan-Feb 1991, vol. 7, issue 3, p.20).
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example, there was an article on vaginal infections and how to reduce the risk of these
while engaging in rough sex.26 There were several articles on AIDS, which were used by
nurses who were readers of OOB to teach about safe sex and the lesbians and practices
who fell into high risk categories.27 The magazine was an excellent place to put all this
information—functioning as “bait” for those who might most need the information.
It is apparent from the letter pages of OOB that OOB had an enormously positive effect on
the lives of many. Some readers lived in places that were violently intolerant of lesbians
and the magazine offered a way for those readers to connect with others like themselves,
in a pre-internet age.28 OOB helped some readers know that contrary to the orthodoxy of
the time, they were quite ordinary in what, as lesbians, turned them on, and in that what
made them lesbians was a sexual orientation, not a political cause.29 Some readers praised
the magazine for helping them to escape guilt about being lesbian.30 The magazine helped
(at  least)  one butch reader see herself  as  beautiful  by presenting butch women thus. 31
There were  also  negative  reactions  to  OOB—though other  readers  often  responded in
OOB's defence. Several objected to a rape fantasy.32 Others defended the fantasy in the next
issue.33 A  reader  objects  to  the  depiction  of  women  in  bondage  and  positions  of
subordination.34 A reader worries that men will misinterpret the images in OOB.35 A reader
objects to an article about butch lesbians wanting to become gay men, claiming: butch
women do not want to become gay men.36 Another reader replies to her: 'don't  tell other
dykes what they should or shouldn't be.'37
OOB  unquestionably  included  material  that  eroticizes  dominance/submission.  So  the
ordinances would threaten both the liberty of the producers and distributors of OOB and
the liberty of OOB's readers to view this material. This was no idle threat. Many opposed
the magazine's contents and multiple attempts were made to stop the distribution of the
magazine without the help of the ordinances.38
26 OOB (Spring 1985, vol. 1, issue 4, p.15).
27 The articles appeared in OOB (Winter 1986, vol. 2, issue 3, p.30) and OOB (Fall 1987, vol. 4. issue 2). The
first was praised in OOB (Spring 1986, vol. 2, issue 4, p.5) and the second in OOB (Spring 1989, vol. 5,
issue 4, p.3).
28 For example, OOB (Fall 1984, vol. 1, issue 2, pp.5-7) and OOB (Spring 1990, vol. 6, issue 3, p.5).
29 For example, OOB (Fall 1984, vol. 1, issue 2, p.7), OOB (Spring 1985, vol. 1, issue 4, p.5), OOB (Spring
1986, vol. 2, issue 4, p.3), and OOB (Fall 1986, vol. 3, issue 2, p.3).
30 For example, OOB (Winter 1985, vol. 1, issue 3, p.5) and OOB (Winter 1987, vol. 3: no 3, p.3).
31 OOB (Winter 1985, vol. 1, issue 3, p.5).
32 OOB (Winter 1988, vol. 4, issue 3, p.3 and p.5). See also OOB (Spring 1990, vol. 6, issue 3, p.3).
33 OOB (Summer 1988, vol. 5, issue 1, p.3).
34 OOB (January-February 1990, vol. 6, issue 3, p.3).
35 OOB (July-August 1990, vol. 6, issue 6, p.7). 
36 OOB (January-February 1991, vol. 7, issue 3, 1991, p.5).
37 OOB (May-June 1991, vol. 7, issue 5, 1991, p.5).
38 In OOB (Summer 1986, vol. 2, issue 5, p.3), a reader tells us that WAP (Women Against Pornography) had
included  pictures  from  OOB  of  pierced  labia  in  their  slide-show  of  material  that  they  believed  to
subordinate women. In OOB (Winter 1987, vol. 3, issue 3, p.3) a reader tells us that a lesbian bookshop
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3.2 Films by women
The availability of videos and VCRs in the 1980s allowed those who didn't want to enter
an adult movie theatre to nonetheless watch sexually explicit material.39 Suspecting  that
many of these people were women,  Candida Royalle  began to produce sexually explicit
videos for women. This material, she thought, should be different from the other material
available, if it is to be for women.40 The differences she introduced were two: differences in
production methods and differences of content.
With respect to production methods, Royalle tried to allow greater space for spontaneity
in her films than had been permitted hitherto. A then standard way to shoot a sexually
explicit film was to set up the lights and cameras so that 20 minutes can be shot of the
performance of one sex act. Stop. Move the cameras and lights. Then commence another
20 minutes of the next sex act. The resulting footage can be edited to produce the film.
Royalle instead gave the performers rough outlines of what the characters would do or
want,  before  the  filming,  and  then  left  them  to  engage  in  sex,  uninterrupted,  from
beginning to end. She allowed camera persons freedom to react to the sex being filmed.
She avoided both camera persons and performers from the mainstream industry, who, she
thought, would replicate the industry's tropes.
Royalle's changes of content were aimed at depicting a certain kind of sex which would
appeal to what Royalle believed to be women's distinctive sexuality.41 One example: she
replaced  the  standard  cum  shot  (a  man  ejaculating  onto  a  woman's  body)  with  the
performers'  faces  when climaxing,  or  clenched hands  or  buttocks.  All  in  all,  Royalle's
sexually  explicit  films had a rather  narrow range of  “soft”  content.  It  therefore seems
unlikely—though not impossible—that Royalle's films would flout the ordinance.42
However, other women who have since produced sexually explicit films have preserved
only Royalle's changes of method and not her narrow content: they acknowledge that not
all women have the same sexual tastes simply in virtue of being women.43 They include:
Nina  Hartley,  Jacky  St.  James,  Erika  Lust,  Tristan  Taormino,  Courtney  Trouble,  and
Madison Young. Each has produced material that eroticizes dominance/submission.44 They
had been excluded from a literature festival because it stocked the magazine.
39 Tony Schwartz, “The TV Pornography Boom,” New York Times Magazine, September 13, 1981.
40 Candida Royalle, “Porn in the USA,”  Social Text, no. 37 (1993): 23–32; Candida Royalle, “What’s a Nice
Girl like You ...,” in The Feminist Porn Book - The Politics of Producing Pleasure, ed. Tristan Taormino et al.
(New York City: The Feminist Press, 2013), 58–70.
41 Royalle, “What’s a Nice Girl like You ...,” 65.
42 Keller (“Powerless to Please: Candida Royalle’s Pornography for Women,”  New England Law Review 26
(1992): 1301) argues that Royalle would be made liable by the ordinance.
43 For the difficulties of defining porn for women by content, see Ms. Naughty, “My Decadent Decade: Ten
Years of Making and Debating Porn for Women,” in The Feminist Porn Book.
44 E.g. Nina Hartley's Guide To Bondage Sex (Nina Hartley), The Sexual Liberation of Anna Lee (Jacky St. James),
Handcuffs (Erika  Lust),  Tristan  Taormino's  Guide  to  Rought  Sex  1-3 (Tristan  Taormino),  Fucking  Mystic
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have various motivations for producing the material that they do. Hartley and Taormino
believe that sexually explicit material can function as good sex education.45 Taormino also
believes that well-designed sexually explicit material can be used to expose what she calls
the  'fallacies  of  gender':  by  which  she  means  the  gender  binary  and  the  stereotypes
common in male-oriented pornography.46 Trouble aims to produce material that shows
people like her (larger, queer women) as desirable.47 Young wants to produce depictions of
authentic desire.48 Lust wants to produce material that reflects her sexuality better than
male oriented material.49
Do women want access to this material? Yes. First, a great many women want access to
sexually explicit material of some sort.50 In a survey of its readers,  marie claire found that
10% of respondents watched sexually explicit material every day, 31% every week or so,
and 30% several times a month.51 Mostly, they watch it because it's a quick route to orgasm
but  also  because  it  provides  ideas  about  what  to  do in  one's  own sex  life  (39%)  and
because it allows one to feel in control of one's sexuality (36%). 51% said that they had
learned  more  about  different  types  of  sex  and sexuality  by  watching  such  material—
something made possible by the availability of a diversity of material.
Second, those who use material that has been labelled “feminist” hold it in high regard. In
her  focus  group  study  of  consumers  of  feminist  pornography,  Liberman  found  that
participants had developed a distaste for mainstream material, but were more likely to
explore non-normative sexual behaviour (including BDSM) when shot through the lens of
a  feminist  director  (as  opposed  to  a  mainstream  director)  because  they  trusted  the
director's  portrayal  of  women's  sexuality  and  the  ethics  of  the  production  of  the
portrayal.52
(Courtney Trouble), and Fifty Shades of Dylan Ryan (Madison Young).
45 Nina Hartley, “Porn: An Effective Vehicle for Sexual Role Modeling and Education,” in The Feminist Porn
Book; Georgina Voss, “Tristan Taormino Interviewed by Georgina Voss,” Porn Studies 1, no. 1 (2014): 203–
5.
46 Tristan Taormino, “Calling the Shots: Feminist Porn in Theory and Practice,” in  The Feminist Porn Book,
262.
47 Rachael  Liberman,  “‘It’s  a  Really  Great  Tool’:  Feminist  Pornography  and  the  Promotion  of  Sexual
Subjectivity,”  Porn  Studies 2,  no.  2–3  (2015):  186;  Courtney  Trouble,  “Positively  Fat  and  Queer:  An
Interview with Indie Porn Insider Courtney Trouble,” in New Views on Pornography: Sexuality, Politics, and
the Law, ed. Lynn Comella and Shira Tarrant (Santa Barbara, California: Praeger, 2015), 371–80.
48 Madison Young, “Authenticity and Its Role within Feminist Pornography,”  Porn Studies 1, no. 2 (2014):
186–88.
49 Rachel  Kramer  Bussel,  “I’m  a  Feminist  Pornography,”  Marie  Claire,  October  21,  2015,
http://www.marieclaire.com/sex-love/a16426/im-a-feminist-pornographer/.
50 As of 2003, women constituted 29% of purveyors of sexually explicit material on the internet: Anne Sabo,
After Pornified: How Women Are Transforming Pornography and Why It Really Matters (Winchester, UK: Zero
Books, 2012), 1.
51 Amanda de Cadenet, “More Women Watch (and Enjoy) Porn Than You Ever Realized: A Marie Claire
Study,”  Marie Claire, October 19, 2015, http://www.marieclaire.com/sex-love/a16474/women-porn-habits-
study/.
52 Liberman, “‘It’s a Really Great Tool’: Feminist Pornography and the Promotion of Sexual Subjectivity,”
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Third, in Crutcher's  study of viewer reactions to feminist and mainstream material, she
found that the difference was recognized: whereas in a mainstream film, the facts that (a) a
particular sex act was unlikely to give sexual pleasure to the woman in the scene (at least,
not to the degree she suggested), and (b) that the timing of particular sex acts and the
pleasures  experienced  were  unrealistic,  made  the  mainstream  material  of  much  less
interest than the feminist material viewed. So clear was the difference, that every female
participant in the study asked for a copy of the feminist scene.53
There  is  then,  in  addition  to  OOB,  other  more  recent  material  that  qualifies  as
pornography,  is  produced by women and which women seem,  for various reasons,  to
want access to. The liberty of these women to produce and consume this material would
be abridged by the ordinance.
3.3 Displayers and Distributors
I  will  describe  three  locations  in  which  pornography  is  distributed  or  displayed  by
women.  Each  is  an  attempt  to  provide  women  with  easy  access  to  sexually  explicit
material that they want to find.
Joani Blank opened the Good Vibrations sex toy store in 1977. Blank had heard many
times women say that, although they may want to buy a vibrator to help them orgasm,
they didn't want to go into a standard “dirty bookstore” where they risked harassment.54
By contrast:
Good Vibrations was, by design, the antithesis of the kind of adult store one might 
expect to find in the red light district of a typical US city. It was a highly gender-
coded environment where women could buy their vibrators, talk about sex, and feel
supported around their sexuality at a time when there were few places to do so.55 
In 1989, the store began to sell sexually explicit material with the same ethic as the store
itself. The videos were selected on the basis of what the store thought its customers might
want. The videos had their covers removed and were placed in unmarked black boxes. The
store provided its own descriptions of the contents  of the videos, which they believed
were more accurate. Employees actively helped women find material that might interest
them. According to the employees of the store,  customers appreciated this.56 But Good
Vibrations  sold  pornography.57 Thus  the  workers  at  Good  Vibrations  were  and  are
180–81. 
53 Emily Crutcher, “‘She’s Totally Faking It!’: The Politics of Authentic Pleasure in Pornography,” in  New
Views on Pornography, 330.
54 Carol Queen, “Good Vibrations, Women and Porn: A History,” in New Views on Pornography, 179.
55 Lynn Comella, “From Text to Context: Feminist Porn and the Making of a Market,” in The Feminist Porn
Book, 83.
56 Cathy Winks in the Good Vibrations Guide to Adult Videos quoted in Ibid., 85.
57 Carol Queen and Lynn Comella, “The Necessary Revolution: Sex-Positive Feminism in the Post-Barnard
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traffickers in pornography.
Stoya created the website Trenchcoatx in 2015: a database of sexually explicit material.58 It
differs from major adult streaming websites in the following way. All such websites must
tag their videos by sexual interest so that they can be searched. On most websites, these
tags are ableist, racist and sexist. Stoya's website deploys a different set of search tags so
that it's possible to search the material on her database without having to use such ableist,
racist or sexist terms. Just as Good Vibrations provided a place through which women
could  find  sexually  explicit  material  without  having  to  enter  a  place  that  was  often
unfriendly to women, Stoya offers something analogous for the internet age. Nonetheless,
some of this material is pornography. Stoya traffics pornography.
Some  university  courses  include  the  display  of  pornographic  material.  For  example,
Constance  Penley  has  taught  a  course  on  sexually  explicit  film since  1993.  She  plays
hardcore  sexually  explicit  films  to  her  students.  The  Santa  Barbara  County  Citizens
Against Pornography group called for her to be fired and her course cancelled.
The local antiporn activists... accused me of exposing children to pornography in  
my classroom, to the anger and dismay of my students who vocally spoke out  
against their characterization as children in letters to the editor of the local paper.59
Some  of  the  material  shown  in  the  course  will  qualify  as  pornography.  Penley  is a
trafficker in pornography.
3.4 Ordeal
Linda Boreman was the main performer of Deep Throat. Boreman wrote an autobiography,
Ordeal, in which she describes how she was violently coerced into performing in that film,
and much else besides. Langton reports finding this book sold in a catalogue of sexually
explicit materials. Of the book, Langton says:
It is there because it is pornography after all: here, in this context, for these intended
hearers, the uptake secured is bound to be that of pornography.60
If Langton is right, then Linda Boreman is a trafficker of pornography.
3.5 Abridged Liberty
The ordinances would threaten all of what has just been described: OOB and the various
Era,” The Communication Review 11 (2008): 287–90.
58 Natasha Lennard, “Can These Pornographers End ‘MILFs,’ ‘Teens,’ and ‘Thugs’?,” The Nation, September
29, 2016, https://www.thenation.com/article/can-changing-our-porn-vocabulary-change-porn-itself/.
59 Constance Penley, “A Feminist Teaching Pornography? That’s Like Scopes Teaching Evolution!,” in  The
Feminist Porn Book, 181.
60 Langton, “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts,” 322.
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functions it served; the woman-made pornography that has attracted a growing audience
of female consumers, who are using it to learn about varieties of sex and sexuality and to
take more control over their own sex lives; the distributors who have sought to make it
easier for women to access a variety of sexually explicit  material outside of unfriendly
spaces; the educators who seek to teach students to think critically about the content and
the economic and social context of sexually explicit material; and even the material that
has been foundational  in the thinking behind the ordinances.  All  of  this  points  to  the
following conclusion: if the ordinances are justified with the aim of protecting women's
liberty, then the ordinances are to some degree self-defeating.
This conclusion must be distinguished from two others which I am not drawing. First, I
am not concluding that no argument in favour of the ordinances can be made to work. I
am concluding that one argument for the ordinances is  to  some degree self-defeating.
Second,  I  am not  concluding  that  pornography  does  not  constitute  or  cause  harm to
women.  On  the  contrary,  we're  assuming  that  some  material  harms  women.  The
conclusion drawn is about the values honestly served by the ordinances  qua means to
confront this assumed harm.
I  will  now address  an  objection to  my assumption  that  because  women produce  and
consume pornography, the ordinances, when justified by the FS argument, are to some
degree self-defeating. The objection goes like this. It is not true that a piece of legislation is
self-defeating when it aims at promoting the liberty of a given group by restricting the
performance of a certain kind of activity, just because some members of that group also
perform that activity. For instance, rape laws and sexual harassment laws restrict certain
activities, in part, with the aim of promoting women's liberty. The laws, however, don't
become self-defeating (to any degree) just because some women rape and sexually harass.
But then there is no reason to think that the ordinances are (to any degree) self-defeating
just because some women produce and distribute material that subordinates women.
There are, however, two important asymmetries between the ordinances on the one hand
and rape and sexual harassment legislation on the other. These asymmetries show that we
can consistently deny that rape and sexual harassment legislation are self-defeating but
affirm that the ordinances (when defended by the FS argument) are.
First, the ordinances allow third parties to define women as victims of pornography even
when the women so defined don't consider themselves to be such.61 This is because the
trafficking  cause  of  action  in  the  ordinances  allows  anyone  to  sue  the  traffickers  of
pornography on behalf of women. One misrepresents the ordinances if one claims that
they  merely  enable  those  who  have  been  directly  harmed  by  a  specific  piece  of
pornography to seek and get redress.62 Thus for instance, it would be quite possible for
61 I owe this observation to  Christine Littleton, “Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes,”
Stanford Law Review 41, no. 3 (1989): 779.
62 Lori Watson, “Pornography,” Philosophy Compass 5, no. 7 (2010): 540.
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Penley to be targetted by a member of the public for harming her adult students even
though  her  students  do  not  consider  themselves  to  be  harmed  in  any  way  by  their
exposure to pornography in Penley's classes.
Neither rape nor sexual harassment legislation allows a (mentally capable, adult) woman
to be treated as  a victim of  rape or  sexual  harassment  against  her  own perception of
whether she is such. With respect to sexual harassment legislation, a third party cannot
sue a person A on behalf of someone B on the ground that A sexually harassed B. B has to
believe that she was sexually harassed and  she has to sue. So a woman is always in a
position, in effect, to veto the judgement that what happened to her is sexual harassment.
With respect to rape legislation, sex is not rape unless it is non-consensual. Sex can be
rough, violent, or even the consensual playing-out of a rape fantasy and still not be rape,
provided that those involved truly consent to such sex. For this reason, whether or not a
woman was raped depends very centrally upon whether or not she consented. The same is
not true with respect to being a victim of the trafficking of pornography. Again, even if
Penley's students consented to the viewing of pornographic materials in Penley's class, the
ordinance allows Penley's students to be treated as victims of Penley.
Secondly,  the  ordinance  restricts  women's  liberty  to  engage  in  activities  beyond  the
subordination of women. It targets materials and not just acts done with materials: it's akin
to a restriction, say,  on alcohol rather than a restriction on drink driving.  That means,
because  other  activities  are  pursued by  means  of  the  use  of  pornography besides  the
subordination  of  women,  the  liberty  of  women  to  engage  in  those  other  activities  is
restricted by the ordinances. Such activities include: gaining access to the community of
OOB when you're stuck in an intolerant part of the U.S. in a pre-internet era, education
about safe and healthy means of carrying out diverse sexual practices, a relatively quick
route to orgasm, and the de-shaming of various kinds of sexuality.  These activities are
considered (in some cases, highly) valuable by a significant number of women.
But there are no further activities which are valued by a significant proportion of women
which would be indirectly restricted in the restricting of rape or sexual harassment. These
pieces of legislation target acts and not objects used to perform those acts (or objects which
are thought, in their very existence, to be the doing of those acts) which can also be used
for other purposes of value to a significant proportion of women.
So,  in  two  respects,  rape  and  sexual  harassment  legislation  are  more  successful  at
promoting women's liberty than the ordinances: they respect women's capacity to dictate
whether or not they should be considered victims by the law and, of the acts of women
they restrict, they restrict only obviously heinous and valueless acts of women (viz., rape
and  sexual  harassment).  The  ordinances  do  neither  of  these  things:  they  remove  an
individual woman's capacity to dictate whether the law should consider her a victim and
they target a range of women's activities besides the obviously heinous and valueless (viz.,
subordinating of women). This difference warrants calling the ordinances, to some degree,
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self-defeating, even if we don't call rape and sexual harassment legislation the same.
Better objects of comparison for the ordinances would be any legislation that, although
aimed at promoting women's liberty, takes away a woman's capacity to dictate whether
the law should consider her a victim and which stops women from engaging in activities
beyond  the  obviously  heinous  and  valueless.  Consider,  for  example,  the  bans  on  the
wearing of headscarves in French schools in 2004 and on the wearing of the burqa and
niqab in public in France in 2011. One justification that has been given for each piece of
legislation is the need to protect girls' and women's freedom to dress as they wish. 63 But
the bans do not allow girls and women to dictate whether the law considers them victims
of forced veiling and they stop girls and women from engaging in activities besides forced
veiling which they consider to be of considerable value; viz.,  consensual veiling. These
bans, justified in this way, are to a degree, self-defeating: even if they liberate those girls
and women who are forced to wear these items, they simultaneously force other girls and
women to give up a practice that is of considerable value to them. Both the bans (when
justified with the aim of protecting women's and girls' liberty) and the ordinances (when
justified with the FS argument) are premised upon a non-existent homogeneity in what
women value:  be  this  in  women's  and  girls'  attitudes  towards  veiling  or  in  women's
attitudes  towards  pornography.  In  this  respect,  the  bans  function  similarly  to  the
ordinances (as justified by the FS argument).
4 Implying that no women are pornographers
I now want to show that MacKinnon, Hornsby, Langton and West have made claims that
imply the non-existence of women who are pornographers. I will argue in the next section
that MacKinnon can make these claims and consistently acknowledge the existence of the
women described in the previous section. There I will also argue that the reason she can
do this affords her a reading of the FS argument on which it doesn't make the ordinances
in any way self-defeating. In section 6, I will argue that Hornsby, Langton and West cannot
follow MacKinnon in this if they want to keep their liberal credentials.
In three ways, MacKinnon implies that no women are pornographers. First, she repeatedly
denies  that  pornographers'  speech  is  women's  speech:  what  we  hear  when  we  hear
pornographic  speech  is  women's  silence,  not  women's  speech.64 If  this  were  true  then
pornographers  could  not  encompass  women.  The  second  and  third  ways  in  which
MacKinnon implies this are both statements she makes in laying out the FS argument. In
one statement of the argument, she writes:
The First Amendment's goals are furthered by restricting the speech of some so that 
63 Joan Wallach  Scott,  The  Politics  of  the  Veil (Princeton,  New Jersey:  Princeton  University  Press,  2007),
chapter  5;  Ulrike  Spohn,  “Sisters  in  Disagreement:  The  Dispute  Among French Feminists  About  the
‘Burqa Ban’ and the Causes of Their Disunity,” Journal of Human Rights 12, no. 2 (2013): 145–64.
64 Dworkin  and  MacKinnon,  In  Harm’s  Way:  The  Pornography  Civil  Rights  Hearings,  276;  MacKinnon,
Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law, 157–58, 181, 194-195, 208-209.
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others might have access to it.65
The word “others” indicates that she's assuming that the group whose members are to
have their speech restricted does not overlap with the group who are to be given access to
speech by means of this restriction. Since the groups in question are pornographers and
women, in this passage, MacKinnon implies that no women are pornographers. In another
statement of the FS argument, MacKinnon writes:
The free speech of men silences the free speech of women. It's the same social goal 
just other people.66
Here, when MacKinnon speaks of men, she is referring to pornographers (this being a
statement of the FS argument). She thus implies that pornographers are men. Given that
men are not women, MacKinnon's statement implies that women are not pornographers.
In two ways, Hornsby, Langton and West also imply that women are not pornographers.
First, Hornsby, Langton and West repeat or paraphrase MacKinnon's aforementioned line:
The free speech of men silences the free speech of women. It's the same social goal 
just other people.
Hornsby, Langton and West deploy this claim in their presentations of the FS argument—
i.e. in speaking of men, they actually mean to speak of pornographers.67 Thus they too
imply that no women are pornographers.
Second,  while  Langton  and  West  acknowledge  that  women  produce  sexually  explicit
material, they do not acknowledge that this material is pornographic. They distinguish
between  erotica  and  pornography  as  mutually  exclusive  categories  and  they  only
countenance the possibility that women want to produce and consume erotica: material
that does not subordinate but is arousing.68 They don't consider the possibility that women
want to produce and have access to material that is dangerous to women.
65 Dworkin and MacKinnon, In Harm’s Way: The Pornography Civil Rights Hearings, 258.
66 MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law, 156, 193.
67 Jennifer Hornsby and Rae Langton, “Free Speech and Illocution,” Legal Theory 4, no. 1 (1998): 21; Langton,
“Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts,” 297; West, “The Free Speech Argument Against Pornography,” 421.
68 Langton, “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts,” 314; Caroline West, “Pornography and Censorship,” ed.
Edward  Zalta,  The  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy,  2012,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/pornography-censorship.  There  is  one  very  brief
moment—that occurs at some distance from her discussion of the FS argument—when West mentions
that some feminists opposed the ordinances because they would generate  'interference with women's
freedom to choose to produce and perform in pornography.' But West's discussion of the FS argument—
including the distinction between erotica and pornography—is conducted as though women would only
ever have reason to produce and consume erotica, not pornography.
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For example, Langton presents the authors of the book Pleasure and Danger as persons who
thought that the effects of pornography could be fought through the production of erotica.
But  this  is  inaccurate.  The authors  of  Pleasure  and Danger wanted women to  have the
freedom  to  produce  and  consume  and  experiment  with  dangerous  material  (i.e.
pornography) because they believed that women's relationship to it is not well understood
and cannot become well understood unless it is available; thus Carol Vance's remarks, in
her introduction to Pleasure and Danger:
A serious effort to examine the relationship between sexual fantasy and behavior  
and agendas for social change is circumvented by the enormity of what we do not 
know:  silences,  oppressions,  repressions,  invisibility,  denials,  omissions,  lies.  
Paradoxically, the effort to rein in sexual behavior and fantasy according to political 
dogma guarantees that the silence will continue and that information challenging it 
is unlikely to emerge.69
The authors of Pleasure and Danger didn't think that erotica ought to be sought instead of
pornography,  but  rather  that  pornography (amongst  other  things)  ought  to  be  sought
because pornography, albeit dangerous, may nonetheless have something to offer women
—a sentiment with an uncanny resemblance to those expressed in the aforementioned
studies by Crutcher, Liberman and marie claire.
Langton and West thus  imply the non-existence of women who are pornographers by
taking  for  granted  a  false  dichotomy  between  those  who  seek  to  produce  non-
subordinating  erotica,  that  is  of  value  to  women,  and  those  who  seek  to  produce
subordinating pornography, that is dangerous to women.
5 MacKinnon on the social construction of women
Earlier,  I  described the  theory upon which the  ordinances  are premised:  pornography
normalizes and makes attractive women's subordination to men. What I did not stress is
that this theory is just as much about the construction of women's sexuality as it is that of
men's.  According  to  the  theory,  pornography,  and  a  variety  of  other  social  processes,
constitute  conditions  under  which  women's  preferences—and  in  particular,  women's
sexual preferences—are formed. However, women do not occupy positions of influence
over  these  conditions.  For  that  reason,  MacKinnon  does  not  believe  that  women's
preferences are truly women's own. This idea finds succinct expression in the following:
In my view, sexuality is to feminism what work is to marxism... By saying that  
sexuality is to feminism what work is to marxism, I mean that both sexuality and 
work focus on that which is most one's own, that which most makes one the being 
the  theory  addresses,  as  that  which  is  most  taken  away  by  what  the  theory  
criticizes. In each theory you are made who you are by that which is taken away 
69 Carole Vance, “Pleasure and Danger: Toward a Politics of Sexuality,” in  Pleasure and Danger: Exploring
Female Sexuality, ed. Carole Vance (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), 22.
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from you by the social relations the theory criticizes.70
The  social  relations  that  MacKinnon's  theory  criticizes  are  various  modes  of  sexual
violence against women and their eroticization: rape, incest, sexual harassment, domestic
violence, prostitution, and pornography. MacKinnon considers all of these to be exertions
of male power over women which are not properly constrained by law and she considers
pornography, in particular, to be a device which makes these exertions of power desirable
and to some extent invisible. For women to genuinely be in control of their preferences,
they must, as a class, occupy positions of power so that women are not constructed by
men to be subordinate to men. One might, as MacKinnon has, express this by saying that
women have been silenced—what MacKinnon calls, a 'silence of the deep kind.'71 Women
who live in the context of gender inequality have been made to have certain preferences
and not others and have thus been barred from expressing what theirs really would be.
From this, and the assumption that there has never been gender equality, MacKinnon's
claim that we have never heard women speak with their own voices, follows.72 Moreover,
if women are not only not in control of their own voices, but those voices have been made
to  serve  gender  inequality,  it  follows  that  simply  liberating  women  as  currently
constructed  is  not  a  way  to  bring  about  gender  equality:  which  explains  both  why
MacKinnon insists that gender equality must be had before concern is rightly given to the
protection of “women's” liberty,73 and why MacKinnon insists that 'interpreting female
sexuality as an expression of women's agency and autonomy is always denigrating and
bizarre and reductive.'74
MacKinnon is quite willing to use the idea that women have been constructed, by others,
to want their own subordination, in order to criticize her opponents. For example, at the
hearing for the Los Angeles ordinance in 1985, MacKinnon makes a remark directed at the
following parties: the U.S. Prostitutes Collective, FACT, a feminist who owns a bookstore,
the aforementioned Sandra Hale, the National Organization for Women's National Board
from the Southwest Region, Stonewall, and the ACLU. Of them, MacKinnon says:
Most broadly, I have heard support for pornography in a way that suggests to me, 
putting it together with what the psychologists have mentioned, that very often  
people who are abused by a system respond by identifying with the abuser and by 
defending the source of the abuse.75
70 MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law, 43.
71 Ibid., 39. See also her opening speech in the Minneapolis hearing, where she says that pornography is
used  to  make  women  lack  ideas  of  their  own  in  Dworkin  and  MacKinnon,  In  Harm’s  Way:  The
Pornography Civil Rights Hearings, 41.
72 MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law, 77, 196.
73 Ibid.,  15,  129-130,  193  and  MacKinnon,  “Sexuality,  Pornography,  and  Method:  ‘Pleasure  under
Patriarchy,’” 344.
74 MacKinnon, “Sexuality, Pornography, and Method: ‘Pleasure under Patriarchy,’” 343.
75 Dworkin and MacKinnon,  In Harm’s Way:  The Pornography Civil  Rights  Hearings,  356. Similarly,  when
reporting  on  the  large  number  of  women  who  opposed  the  ordinance  in  the  Los  Angeles  hearing,
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The  broader  context  in  which  the  preferences  of  these  women  were  formed  leads
MacKinnon to quite unabashedly dismiss them as speaking with compromised voices.
Our interest in all this lies in the following. MacKinnon's view of what is required for
women to truly own their own voices allows her to consistently deny that women are
pornographers  without  denying the  existence  of  the  women described in  section  3.  It
allows her to say: although plenty of pornography derives from the hands and mouths of
women,  it  is  not  really  their speech.  Similarly,  the  liberty  of  women  to  express  their
sexuality  by  means  of  consuming pornography  will  not  really  be  an  exercise  of  their
liberty. In each case, these women do not inhabit the social context they need to inhabit, if
their speech and action are to be truly their own. MacKinnon's view of what's required for
women to truly  own their  voices  and actions,  in turn,  allows her  a  reading of  the FS
argument according to which silencing 'of the deep kind' is amongst the several kinds of
silencing  that  the  ordinance  is  supposed  to  address.76 The  reading  goes  like  this.
Pornography silences women in the sense that it is a feature of women's social context that
makes others the authors of women's sexuality and hence any expression of that sexuality.
Restrictions on pornography (such as the ordinance) are justified because they take back
the authorship of women's sexualities from others and place them in women's own hands
by  changing  women's  social  context.  So  the  ordinance  promotes  women's  freedom of
speech by addressing the inequality that makes women, as a class, not authors of their
own voices. The argument thereby concludes. This reading of the argument is not at all
shown to be self-defeating by the existence of the women described in section 3, because
although  speech  that  derives  from  their  hands  and  mouths  will  be  silenced  by  the
ordinances, that speech isn't really women's speech.
Hornsby, Langton and West have been keenly interested in providing accounts of how
pornography could silence women's speech.77 It's worth noting that none of these accounts
interpret the claim that pornography silences women in the way that I have just proposed
MacKinnon  could  intend  it.  All  of  the  philosophers'  accounts  distinguish  between  a
woman's intentions to perform speech acts and the successful performance of those speech
acts. Pornography contributes towards the thwarting of the act but leaves the intention
MacKinnon (ibid,  pp.  11-12)  dismisses  those  who opposed it  as  'biological  females'—insinuating that
those who spoke against the ordinances were not speaking with “women's” voices (or perhaps that they
were  speaking  with  women's voices  all  too  well  i.e.  with  'that  which  is  most  taken  away  by  what'
MacKinnon's  theory  criticizes).  She  (ibid,  p.12)  dismisses  those  women  who  opposed  the  proposed
ordinance in Massachusetts by calling them mere 'mouthpieces' for other interests.
76 MacKinnon makes several different kinds of silencing claim: pornography constructs women so that they
have nothing to say (MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law, 39); pornography scares
or  terrorizes  women  into  not  speaking  at  all  (ibid,  28,  130,  131,  140,  156,  180-181,  193,  194-195;
pornography stops women from being understood (ibid,  166,  169-171);  pornography lowers women's
(perceived) credibility (ibid, 132, 180).
77 Hornsby, “Speech Acts and Pornography”; Langton, “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts”; West, “The
Free Speech Argument Against Pornography.”
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untouched—the intentions are always women's own. So, on these interpretations of the
silencing claim, pornography's silencing of women is never deep. It stops women from
doing what they want. It doesn't make women want what they want. But if we read the FS
argument only in terms of this “shallow” kind of silencing, then the ordinance defended
by the FS argument—so understood—is to some extent  self-defeating.  For  if  we don't
consider the intentions of these women to be compromised in the way that MacKinnon is
willing,  then  we  have  to  acknowledge  that  although  the  ordinance  might  stop  some
silencing of women, it will simultaneously silence women.
6 Liberals cannot follow MacKinnon
MacKinnon can avoid the charge that, if the ordinance is defended by the FS argument
then it is to some extent self-defeating, by coupling the argument with her view of the
relationship  between  gender  inequality  and  women's  ownership  of  their  own  voices.
Couldn't Hornsby, Langton and West do the same? In this section I am going to argue that
they cannot if they want to maintain their liberal credentials.
For a person to be procedurally autonomous, her preferences for action must (and need
only) meet  requirements  that  are  both  internal  and  value-neutral.78 A requirement  is
internal if it focuses upon processes that are internal to the person. It does not require that
a person stand in certain social or political relations. It instead requires, for example, that
the person have certain psychological properties such as an ability to critically reflect on
what she wants. A requirement is value-neutral if it does not require that a person have
preferences with particular contents. For example, a requirement that said that a person is
autonomous only if her preferences are respectful of women would not be an admissible
requirement  on a procedural  conception of  autonomy. Other conceptions of  autonomy
deviate  from  the  procedural  by  rejecting  either  value-neutrality  (i.e.  substantive
conceptions of autonomy) or internalism (i.e. relational conceptions of autonomy).
Within a liberal state, the concept of autonomy (whichever one it is) is used 'to define and
“mark” the citizen-subject of principles of justice', i.e., within that context, autonomy is
treated as 'the characteristic of persons who are candidates for full participation in [...]
collective decision-making processes.'79 It determines, not whose welfare the state should
care for  but,  to  whom the  state  is  answerable.  Thus,  depending upon how we define
autonomy,  we  shift  who  is  entitled  to  participate  within  collective  decision-making
processes of the state i.e. those debates that settle public policy. A liberal who is committed
to value pluralism will tend to favour a procedural conception of autonomy as the mark of
the citizen-subject: she doesn't want to rig the debate by gerrymandering its participants.
She wants policy to get fixed by the outcome of a debate that is as inclusive as possible.
Non-procedural  conceptions  of  autonomy  tend  to  exclude  more  people  from  these
78 Gerald Dworkin,  The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  1988);
Harry Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
79 John Christman, “Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism, and the Social Constitution of Selves,”
Philosophical Studies 117 (2004): 156.
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processes than procedural conceptions.80 
When MacKinnon assumes that, because women inhabit the social context that they do,
their  speech  and  action  is  not  really  theirs,  she  assumes  a  relational  conception  of
autonomy: no matter what internal, content-neutral constraints women meet, MacKinnon
will  deny that  women's  speech  is  their  own insofar  as  they  exist  in  such  a  context.81
Furthermore, if we read the FS argument for the ordinance as about (at least) this kind of
silencing, then MacKinnon will be employing a relational conception of autonomy as the
mark of the citizen-subject: for she will be justifying coercive restrictions on the speech of
the class of women described in section 3 by denying that that speech is really speech from
autonomous persons.
Herein lies a clear, principled conflict between MacKinnon and a fairly standard kind of
liberal. Whereas the liberal will not consider a failure of relational autonomy to be reason
enough  to  diminish  the  authority  that  should  be  accorded  a  person's  voice  within
collective decision-making processes, MacKinnon, appears to do precisely that: and she
needs to do that, given the way she understands gender inequality. To do anything else,
given her view of gender inequality, would be to leave in place a potent self-defensive
mechanism of gender inequality: selves constructed so as to defend that inequality. That's
why '[f]eminism thus does not “assume”, it rather builds, its “women.” From women who
socially exist.'82
80 Killmister and Oshana defend relational autonomy against the charge by Christman that its use in this
role  will  lead to  the  oppression  of  the  already  oppressed  and to  an  objectionable  perfectionism,  by
removing relational  autonomy from this  role.  Cf.  Suzy Killmister,  “Autonomy,  Liberalism,  and Anti-
Perfectionism,”  Res  Publica 19,  no.  4  (2013):  353–69;  Marina  Oshana,  Personal  Autonomy  in  Society
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).
81 It  makes  no  difference  to  the  line  of  reasoning  adopted  here  whether  we  ascribe  a  substantive  or
relational conception of autonomy to MacKinnon—just so long as the conception we ascribe diverges
from the procedural  conception favoured by many liberals.  Nonetheless,  I  do  not  think it  correct  to
ascribe to MacKinnon use of a substantive conception of autonomy. One reason for doubt is that, as we
have seen, MacKinnon does not draw upon a purported gap between an authentic woman's voice whose
authenticity is  defined on the basis of content and what we currently hear  from women—she draws
instead upon observations  of  women's  social  and political  context  as  that  which  thwarts  a  woman's
possession  of   her  own  voice.  Thus,  for  example,  when  MacKinnon  criticizes  Carol  Gilligan  for
identifying a certain set of feminine values with women's values, she does so, not because those values in
themselves are not women's own, or even because those values are inherently problematic, but instead
because of what happens if those values are pursued in conditions of gender hierarchy: 'Given existing
male dominance, those values amount to a set-up to be shafted' (in Ellen DuBois et al., “Feminist Discourse,
Moral Values, and the Law--A Conversation,” Buffalo Law Review 34 (1985): 74. [my emphasis]). A second
reason for doubt is that MacKinnon is adamant that she does not know what women would say if they
had control over their own voices (cf. Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law, 77). She claims to
know only that women inhabit a position in which their actions and words are consequences of myriad
pressures, over which women as a class lack control. What would happen if women gained significant
influence over those pressures is something upon which she remains neutral. But she could not adopt
that position if she deployed a substantive conception of autonomy which would make it definitive of
autonomous acts and speech that they have certain aims and contents, rather than others.
82 Catharine MacKinnon, “Points Against Postmodernism,” Chicago-Kent Law Review 75, no. 3 (2000): 696.
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Quite plausibly, it's this conflict that Ronald Dworkin saw when he directly criticised the
FS  argument.83 In  his  discussion  of  the  argument,  Dworkin  alludes  to  a  historical
corruption of  positive liberty.  Positive liberty  is  the power to  control  or  participate  in
public  decisions. The corruption that Dworkin describes begins with the drawing of  a
distinction  between a  citizen's  “rational  self”  (roughly,  the  wants  the  citizen,  in  some
sense, ought to have) and her “empirical self” (roughly, the wants the citizen actually has).
To have positive liberty is to act on the basis of one's rational self, and not merely one's
empirical self. The corruption then moves to lumber the state with the project of making
citizens act in accordance with their rational selves:
Freedom, on that conception, is possible only when people are governed, ruthlessly 
if  necessary,  by  rulers  who know their  true,  metaphysical,  will.  Only then  are  
people truly free, albeit against their will.84
This describes MacKinnon's attitude towards the women described in section 3. So like
other  liberals  who  favour  procedural  autonomy  as  the  mark  of  the  citizen-subject,
Dworkin would not find the FS argument compelling. It is an example of the corruption of
positive liberty he opposed.
Moreover, it seems highly unlikely that the (liberal) judges who rejected the Indianapolis
ordinance as unconstitutional  would accept  this  way of  protecting the ordinance from
being,  to  any  degree,  self-defeating.  Judge  Barker  draws  attention  to  MacKinnon's
assimilation of the position of adult women to the position of children.85 Children are a
paradigm of those who lack the mark of the citizen-subject. Barker rejects the assimilation.
Judge  Easterbrook  believed  that  the  ordinance  would  restrict  the  liberty  of  women's
speech  when  that  speech  has  political  importance—as  I  have  been  describing.86 The
question is: if one were to reply to Easterbrook by denying that the speech of women that
would get restricted is truly women's own, would this change Easterbrook's mind? Not
likely. These liberal judges would have no truck with the suggestion that women as a class
lack the mark of the citizen-subject.
Hornsby,  Langton and West  face,  then,  a  dilemma. Either  they can retain  their  liberal
credentials  and  provide  a  version  of  the  FS  argument  which  focuses  upon a  kind  of
silencing that doesn't presuppose a non-procedural conception of autonomy as the mark
of the citizen-subject, or they can lean upon the idea that pornography induces a silence of
the deep kind. If they do the former, then the existence of the class of women described in
83 Ronald Dworkin, “Liberty and Pornography,” The New York Review of Books 38, no. 14 (August 15, 1991):
12–15; Ronald Dworkin, “Women and Pornography,”  The New York Review of Books 40, no. 17 (10 1993),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1993/oct/21/women-and-pornography/.
84 Dworkin, “Liberty and Pornography.”
85 598 F. Supp. 1316 (1984) at 1332-1334.
86 771 F.2d 323 at 325 and 332.
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section 3 means that to some degree, the ordinances defended by the FS argument are self-
defeating. They might well empower some women to have some speech but, at the same
time, the concerns of Hale, Hollibaugh, the founders of OOB and others would be realized.
Women would have their liberty to express, explore and develop sexualities that are not
properly “feminist” abridged. If, on the other hand, the philosophers do the latter, then
they will lose their liberal credentials in using a non-procedural conception of autonomy
as the mark of the citizen-subject.
One might try to slip out of this dilemma by justifying the prioritization of certain liberties
of women over others. The liberty of women to (for example) explore, better understand
and sharpen differences between assault and violent sex, is less important than the liberty
of women to live in a world in which, although the threat of assault is reduced, the two are
conflated. However, any attempt to do so would transform the FS argument into a defence
of the ordinances which is based on a value other than the value of women's liberty. For
we need some reason to think that some of women's liberties are so much more important
than others that the latter are worth sacrificing for the sake of the former. That reason
might be a concern for gender equality or for women's safety or something else. But it
won't be a concern for women's liberty. The envisaged response gives up the ambition of
defending the ordinances by appeal to the value of women's liberty as opposed to other
values. It does not address the challenge I am raising to this ambition.
7 Liberalism and the problem of pornography
Does this mean that we cannot address, within a liberal context, the problem pornography
poses  for  gender  inequality?  No:  there  are  at  least  two remaining  ways in  which the
problem of pornography can be addressed within a liberal context.
First, there are other arguments besides the FS argument that attempt to work from liberal
commitments (e.g. equality) for restrictions on pornography.87 Those might still succeed
even if the FS argument does not. They might show that the commitments of liberals like
Ronald Dworkin, and the judges who ruled the Indianapolis ordinance unconstitutional,
command  forfeit  of  a  value  pluralism  that  encompasses  sexualities  that  eroticize
dominance/submission (and hence the pornography that helps construct them).
Second,  it  might  be  possible  to  address  the  problem  pornography  poses  without
restricting, and therefore without forfeiting this value pluralism. This depends both upon
how one defines gender equality and upon the tightness of the connection between the
eroticization  of  dominance/submission  and  gender  inequality.  If  one  defines  gender
equality so that, by definition, it is incompatible with the existence of persons who find
dominance/submission  sexually  arousing,  then  gender  equality  is  incompatible  with  a
87 Rae Langton, “Pornography: A Liberal’s Unfinished Business,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence
12, no. 1 (1999): 109–33; Lori Watson, “Pornography and Public Reason,” Social Theory and Practice 33, no.
3 (2007): 467–88.
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liberalism  that  respects  a  value  pluralism  that  encompasses  sexualities  that  eroticize
dominance/submission, and hence, pornography. This,  however,  is  not necessarily so if
one defines gender equality in such a way that, at least conceptually, it doesn't require the
elimination  of  sexualities  that  eroticize  dominance/submission.  Let's  call  whatever  is
constitutive of gender equality—where it does not require, by definition, the elimination of
sexualities  that  eroticize  dominance/submission—“G.”  Ex  hypothesi,  G  does  not  obtain
anywhere. If we believe MacKinnon's theory, pornography currently contributes towards
the non-obtaining of G. However, pornography may do this in two ways: it may do it
necessarily, so that, although we're not  defining gender equality as incompatible with the
eroticization  of  dominance/submission,  nonetheless,  realistically,  it's  only  by  the
elimination  of  material  that  eroticizes  dominance/submission  that  G  could  obtain;  or
alternatively, pornography may do this contingently, so that even without the elimination
of  pornography,  G  could  realistically  obtain.  If  pornography  has  whatever  (causal  or
constitutive) effects it does on G only contingently, then there's no incompatibility between
even a liberalism that respects a value pluralism that encompasses sexualities that eroticize
dominance/submission  and  gender  equality.  Although  in  some  circumstances,  the
eroticization of dominance/submission may contribute towards the non-obtaining of G,
circumstances can in principle be changed so that it doesn't, without the elimination of
sexualities  that  eroticize  dominance/submission,  and  hence,  without  eliminating
pornography (as we have defined it).
The nature of sexually explicit material—whether we understand it on the model of other
pictures and films, or instead (as Langton recommends), on the model of speech acts—
makes  its  meaning  and  consequences  inherently  context-sensitive.88 This  theoretical
context-sensitivity  is  supported  empirically  by  the  fact  that  debriefings  following  the
viewing  of  violent  sexually  explicit  material  significantly  mitigate  negative  attitudes
towards women, and by the fact that pre-dispositions to be misogynistic are an important
precondition for sexually explicit material's negative influence on men's attitudes towards
women.89 But,  like  MacKinnon,  one  may  believe  that  any  attempt  by  women to  take
advantage of this context-sensitivity—to craft the context of pornography so as to turn its
meaning and effects  (both causal  and constitutive)  away from gender inequality—will
inevitably result in the co-optation of women's voices in the service of gender inequality.
Taormino, for example, describes how she had to make compromises against her wishes in
order to get a distribution deal for her work with a major distributor: her voice bent to its
male-monopolized context.90
88 Susan Etta  Keller,  “Viewing and Doing:  Complicating Pornography’s  Meaning,”  The  Georgetown Law
Journal 81 (1993): 2195–2242; Jennifer Saul, “Pornography, Speech Acts and Context,”  Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 106 (2006): 229–48.
89 Neil Malamuth and James Check, “Debriefing Effectiveness Following Exposure to Pornographic Rape
Depictions,” The Journal of Sex Research 20, no. 1 (1984): 1–13; Neil Malamuth, Gert Martin Hald, and Mary
Koss, “Pornography, Individual Differences in Risk and Men’s Acceptance of Violence Against Women in
a Representative Sample,” Sex Roles 66 (2012): 427–39.
90 Taormino, “Calling the Shots: Feminist Porn in Theory and Practice,” 256–57. See also: Rebecca Whisnant,
“‘But What About Feminist Porn?’: Examining the Work of Tristan Taormino,” Sexualization, Media, and
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Maybe.  But  it  must  be acknowledged that  nothing MacKinnon (nor anyone else)  says
compels  us  to  conclude  that  all  attempts  to  exercise  what  agency  women  have  in
conditions  of  oppression  will  inevitably  backfire.  A  long-standing  criticism  of
MacKinnon's feminism is that it exaggerates the extent to which persons lose their capacity
to act for themselves in conditions of oppression—which is why it risks recommending
solutions to gender inequality (like the ordinances) that empower women insofar as they
agree to view themselves as victims and actively disempower women who don't.91 The
system MacKinnon implores us to believe in apparently has flaws. It  is possible to get
turned  on  by  dominance/submission  without  losing  one's  ability  to  tell  the  difference
between sex (no matter how violent) and assault.92 And although Taormino's experience is
no doubt symptomatic, the material she and others produce is recognizably different to
that  produced  by  men.93 Moreover,  the  kind  of  economic  dynamic  which  pressured
Taormino to compromise is to some extent diminishing in the adult film industry, just as it
is in the music industry, thanks to the internet's democratization of access to the means of
distribution.94
To really know whether even a liberalism that respects a value pluralism that encompasses
the eroticization of dominance/submission is compatible with gender equality, we need to
better understand what MacKinnon takes for granted: whether the production of material
that eroticizes dominance/submission can only further entrench gender inequality. If not—
if its production can be either neutral on this score (given suitable changes elsewhere, e.g.,
sex education or enhanced literacy of sexually explicit material), or perhaps even a part of
a means of bringing about gender equality—then it might well be possible (in principle, at
least) to address the problem pornography poses for gender equality without significant
restrictions on sexually  explicit  material  that  eroticizes dominance/submission:  because
then  their  relation—the  relation  between  such  material  and  gender  equality—is  only
contingent, not necessary.95
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91 Kathryn Abrams,  “Sex  Wars  Redux:  Agency  and Coercion  in  Feminist  Legal  Theory,”  Columbia  Law
Review 95  (1995):  304–76;  Ellen  DuBois  et  al.,  “Feminist  Discourse,  Moral  Values,  and  the  Law--A
Conversation,”  Buffalo  Law  Review 34  (1985):  70;  Michele  Moody-Adams,  “Reclaiming  the  Idea  of
Equality,”  in  Feminist  Interventions  in  Ethics  and  Politics:  Feminist  Ethics  and  Social  Theory (Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 184–201; Ellen Willis, “Comment (Ellen Willis),” in Marxism and
the Interpretation of Culture, ed. Cary Nelson (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 117.
92 Noam Haviv, “Reporting Sexual Assaults to the Police: The Israeli BDSM Community,” Sexuality Research
and Social Policy 13, no. 3 (2016): 276–87.
93 For  Taormino,  see  Crutcher,  “‘She’s  Totally  Faking  It!’:  The  Politics  of  Authentic  Pleasure  in
Pornography.”. For others, see Sabo, After Pornified: How Women Are Transforming Pornography and Why It
Really Matters.
94 Courtenay Daum, “Feminism and Pornography in the Twenty-First Century: The Internet’s Impact on the
Feminist Pornography Debate,” Women’s Rights Law Reporter 30, no. 3 (2009 2008): 543–65.
95 This paper has greatly benefited from extensive criticism and comment from several parties. An earlier
draft  of  this  paper  was  presented  at  the  Gender,  Race  and  Sexuality  Seminar  at  the  University  of
Barcelona, run by Esa Díaz-León, in Spring 2015. I am grateful to Esa for the invitation and to everyone
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